Oldal 71 [71]
INTENT TO DO RIGHT?
irreducible and primitive intention"), " Toumella and Miller (we-intention)"®
among others.
In a limited sense sharing an intention has a neural basis in "mirror-matching
systems" of the brain." Such mirroring mechanisms allow an agent to distinguish
one’s own actions from those of other agents and acquire a “sense of agency”.”°
Georgieff and Jeannerod note that there is a partial overlap between self-produced
and observed action in cortical activation of respondents, which means that
representation of action could be shared among individuals. Non-overlapping
zones of representation allow subjects to attribute action to themselves or
others.” According to Becchio and Bertone sharing a representation of an action
is possible when a “neural representation of the executed action tends to overlap
the representation of the observed action”.”?
However, as Jeannerod notes, not all intentions are action representations,
but only what Searle calls “intention in action”, and what Jeannerod calls “motor
intentions”.”* That is, intentions of the sort that Wittgenstein mentions when
asking “what is left over if I subtract that my arm goes up from the fact that I
raise my arm?””*. Therefore, sharing is also applicable only to such “intention-in¬
action” (“I am doing A”), but not to more complex “prior intentions” (“I will do A”
or “I am going to do A”).?
Prior intentions, that is, long-term and complex, premeditated plans and
foresight, cannot be shared in the same sense that unattributed ‘intentions in
action’ can, and remain strictly individual. The intentions that are shared in
joint criminal enterprise, criminal conspiracy, or joint and indirect perpetration
under the Rome Statute, cannot by any measure be considered as simple motor
intentions. When saying “we intend to do A” the notion of intention is completely
different than in “I raise my arm minus my arm goes up”. Whereas individuals
act socially, collectively, cooperatively and competitively, and often actions are
John Searle, Consciousness and Language, Cambridge, CUP, 2010, 90-105.
18 Raimo Toumela — Kaarlo Miller, We-intentions, Philosophical Studies 53 (1988).
Cristina Becchio — Cesare Bertone, Wittgenstein running: Neural mechanisms of collective
intentionality and we-mode, Consciousness and Cognition 13 (2004).
Marc Jeannerod et al., Action recognition in normal and schizophrenic subjects, in T.
Kircher — A. David (eds.), The Self in Neuroscience and Psychiatry, Cambridge, CUP, 2003,
380-406.
Nicolas Georgieff - Marc Jeannerod, Beyond Consciousness of External Reality: A “Who”
System for Consciousness of Action and Self-Consciousness, Consciousness and Cognition
7 (1998), 465-477.
Bechio — Bertone, Wittgenstein running, 131.
23 Marc Jeannerod, Motor cognition: What actions tell the self, Oxford, OUP, 2006, 3-4.
4 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford, Basil
Blackwell, 1958, para. 621.
25 John Searle, Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, New York, NY, CUP, 1983, 84.
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