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HRVOJE VOLNER
dinars to 0.60 dinars per kilogram in 1930, and that 60% of national income
of Yugoslavia came from agricultural production, then it becomes clear that
inequality had to be the cause of the destruction of the nation. In addition
to everything else, we should mention a ten-year tax inequality between the
newly acquired regions and the former Kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro,
which was justified by the war damage, but also as a reward to Serbia for
winning the war, and the newly added areas were treated as colonies.”
The expropriation of forest estates especially affected the disposal of private
property that became unsafe. Industrial companies for the exploitation of forest
and wood processing (largely owned by foreign capital) tried to ensure the
stability of their business, but this was only possible by providing concessions,
which were charged by bribing the responsible people in the government.
Although the interwar Yugoslavia publically wrote that it was the foreign
capitalists (mainly Hungarian Jews) who had corrupted the country, it was the
rulers who were setting up the framework of market competition. This certainly
contributed to a slowdown in the modernization of the economic system of the
country, where the industry was concentrated on drawing a maximum profit
from raw materials and poorly qualified labor. The corruption, which in the
interwar Yugoslavia was encouraged by the government, caused a significant
delay in the modernization processes.”*
The next cut was created by World War II, which caused the deletion of
entire ethnic communities that were holders of modernization in certain
areas. According to what has so far been researched, it is clear that the
quisling government, supported by German invaders, expropriated the Serbs,
Jews, Romas. Was this modernization by murder? Kept in Croatian archives
are the documents that bring the decisions on nationalization of non-Aryan
property. There were cases, such as the one of Viktor Gutmann, when the
Ustasha officials kept some individuals in management positions if they could
not replace them with someone more eligible. This is evidenced by letters of a
circular character which sought the removal of Serbs, Jews and Masons from
certain activities, but only if they were not necessary. In practice, all of this
meant the loss of mostly professional manpower in trade, industry, transport,
and the public sector, but also in the opposite direction, after the war, a loss
2 Mijo Mirkovié: Ekonomska struktura Jugoslavije, Zagreb, Nakladni zavod Hrvatske, 1950,
10, 13, 23-33; Ivan Laji¢ — Mario Bara: Ratovi, kolonizacija i nacionalna struktura Slavonije
u dvadesetom stoljecu, Zagreb, Institut za migracije i narodnosti, 2009, 66-68, 70; Boris
Krsev: Finansijska politika Jugoslavije 1918-1941; Novi Sad, Prometej, 2007, 64-74, 124,
125-128.
Compare the papers of Zdenka Simonéi¢-Bobetko: Izvlastenje veleposjedni¢kih Suma
u Hrvatskoj 1919-1941. godine, Casopis za suvremenu povijest 25, 1993, 232-233; and
Osnovne karakteristike industrijskog razvoja na podruëju Hrvatske u meduratnom
razdoblju, Acta Historico-Economica lugoslaviae, 1, Zagreb, 1974, 61-62; and also Smiljana
Durovié: DrZavna intervencija u industriji Jugoslavije 1918-1941, Beograd, Institut za
savremenu istoriju, 1986, 39, 42-50.
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