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What must I do (and why me)? | 83 can recognise the Vedic sources of Naess’ philosophy. And if we read it as an account of the human state, in the centre of which stands the openness of the Self to the world and self-understanding, then the influence of Martin Heidegger’s approach to human existence becomes evident as well. As for the idea of the compassion and responsibility arising from the suffering and will to live of other beings, that is familiar directly from the writings of Albert Schweitzer. Naess opposes the legacy of the Early-Modern theory of knowledge that dulls and objectifies nature with the arguments of Gestalt philosophy: European science doubles the world. It places experience and the sensual qualities in the subjective sphere and recognises as real only the objects of cognition constructed according to the strict methodological precepts of mathematical logic and experimental physics. (He could of course here also refer to Edmund Husserl.) Naess’ transpersonal ecology drew enthusiastic followers, but also much criticism from his colleagues. They held him to account mostly for the return of anthropocentrism under the guise of the concept of identification. “Given this emphasis on the gestalt-experience of the human subject, it is difficult to see how the relational holistic ontology of deep ecology can avoid an anthropocentric bias. Human beings cannot escape the anthropocentric character of their relational experiences.” Others pointed out that if one makes nature the extension of the Self, then in the rush of identification one can easily forget its fundamental and insoluble otherness. A limitless Self can have no environment, since the world is not centred around it, but rather belongs, so to speak, to its being. And yet “...the deepest intuitions of deep ecologists are formed as much if not more from the direct experience of the mysterious and radical otherness of nature than from a transpersonal identification with it.”,* as Leslie Paul Thiele reminds us. How can man approach nature so that what is revealed in this relationship — the truth — is not the result of the appropriation and objectification of nature, but rather the result of preservative care, which is capable of maintaining in its own infinite otherness what it understands? But what else could be termed understanding if not our exceptional capacity to see beyond our own interests and biases and become the conscious and joyful admirers of the fantastic wealth of a more-than-human world? Naess’ true intentions are no doubt directed °’ Eric Katz: Against the Inevitability of Anthropocentrism. In: E. Katz — A. Light -D. Rothenberg eds.: Beneath the Surface, p.36. MIT Press, 2000. 5° Leslie Paul Thiele: Nature and Freedom. Environmental Ethics 17.2. 1995. p.188.
