Oldal 161 [161]
OCR
Global Europe and strategic sovereignty | 159 than the Union’s strategic autonomy, while lacking the institutional aspect of the term. For some, the “EU option is the most logical’, as the Union provides the best institutional framework for pursuing European strategic autonomy (Biscop 2019, 124). Others, however, do not see a reason for linking this objective to any specific institutional setting (e.g. Jarvenpaa et al. 2019). The challenges and pitfalls of strategic autonomy are also highlighted in the academic discourse. One of the standard counterarguments is that European strategic autonomy would weaken, or even undermine, the transatlantic alliance. In Tocci’s view, a more pertinent problem is that Europeans’ quest for autonomy will lead to power concentration and protectionism within the Union, going against the very core values of the integration project (Tocci 2021). Others criticise the lack of clarity of the term; or argue that it has a French flavour, which raises suspicions in some EU countries. Dismissive opinions also point to various in-built contradictions in the idea, or even call it a “toxic debate” that lacks any concrete political programme (Major and Mölling 2020). Beyond the academic polemics, EU Member States also maintain diverging approaches towards strategic autonomy in security and defence - even if cleavages have somewhat diminished recently due to a growing number of voices supporting the orientation towards more autonomous actions. Several studies have been devoted to analysing Member States’ attitudes in this regard, showing that conflicting national positions are mainly driven by a diversity of strategic cultures and threat perceptions. Not surprisingly, the idea of strategic autonomy is the most elaborated in the Union’s sole nuclear power, France, as the sense of autonomy is deeply rooted in the country’s strategic thinking. While there is an ever-present suspicion towards the French position, Paris has regularly underlined that she was bound to her commitments in NATO, whose alliance shall remain responsible for European territorial defence. In the case of Germany, the notion of strategic autonomy cannot be detected in official documents. Nevertheless, a paradigm shift can be noticed in Berlin’s approach towards European security and defence cooperation through taking more responsibility, including in the EU framework. However, the rift between the German and French views persists, as also mirrored explicitly in the former German Minister of Defence Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer’s call for an “end to illusions of European strategic autonomy? Intra-EU divergences about the need for strategic autonomy are linked in many ways to the relations with the United States and with NATO. The doubters - most prominently the Baltic States and Poland - fear that more European autonomy will lead to less American involvement in, and commitment to, Europe’ security. This sentiment has also been reinforced by American concerns about recent EU defence initiatives - notably the launch of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF) - which were considered by many in Washington as
