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OCR
158 | Zsolt Nagy, Zoltán Simon, Viktor Szép, and Tamás Dezső Ziegler decide and to act without depending on the capabilities of third parties. (European Commission 2013) The same year, the European Council also highlighted this term by declaring that strengthening Europes industrial and technological potential in the field of defence would enhance its strategic autonomy (European Council 2013). The next and a decisive milestone in the evolution of the concept was the publication, in 2016, of the EUs new Global Strategy (EUGS). Ihe EUGS painted a rather dire picture and raised existential guestions about the Unions future. This was not only because the document was brought out by High Representative Federica Mogherini in the wake of the United Kingdom's Brexit referendum, but also because it reflected fundamental changes in Europe's security environment, which called for a realistic reassessment of the EU’s interests and priorities. One of the key statements in the document emphasised that “an appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy is important for Europe’s ability to foster peace and safeguard security within and beyond its borders” (European Union 2016, 9). This placed the term in the centre of debates about the EU’s role in the world. In parallel, alternative terminologies also started to proliferate, such as strategic independence, open strategic autonomy, strategic sovereignty, or European sovereignty, to mention just a few. Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that a dynamically growing literature attempts to shed light on the meaning, purpose, and perspectives of European strategic autonomy. As we have seen, the concept derived from the security and defence domain, and has filtered into other policy areas. Nevertheless, as security and defence still remain critical elements to strengthen the EU’s the EU’s strategic autonomy, the development of adequate military capabilities by European states continues to be perceived by many as the most pressing need (e.g. Zandee et al. 2020). Frédéric Mauro goes even further by stating that strategic autonomy should explicitly be confined to the military sphere, otherwise it will only lead to confusion. In his view, this concept is no more and no less than the ability “to wage a war alone” (Mauro 2018). When it comes to the definition of strategic autonomy, one of the most compelling definitions claims that it is “the ability of European states to set their own priorities and make their own decisions in matters of foreign policy, security and defence, and have the means to implement these decisions alone, or with partners if they so choose” (Jarvenpaa et al. 2019). This interpretation contains all the elements that are common in many analyses describing the concept as an “ability”, which is linked to “own decisions and means” and the possibility to act in “partnership” when necessary. One may also notice that the standard terminology is "European strategic autonomy, while EU documents refer to EU’ strategic autonomy. It is obvious that European strategic autonomy, if we understand it literally, is broader
