Oldal 118 [118]
OCR
116 | Anna Unger was a dramatic shift in understandings of what it would take to ensure democratic consolidation in Europe. Across the political spectrum people recognized that bringing stable, well functioning democracies to Europe would require much more than merely eliminating dictatorships and changing political institutions and procedures; it would necessitate revising the relationship that existed among states, markets and society as well. (Berman 2011, 68) This resulted in the recognition that European countries needed “a regime type which entails dramatic changes not merely in political arrangements, but in social and economic ones as well” (Berman 2011, 68). The great merit of Berman's finding is that it reframes the whole debate about the current democratic malaise or backsliding. Instead of elaborating on which elements of liberal democracy are more important and deserve utmost protection against the other, she shows that the roots of contemporary liberal democracy are elsewhere. They are not to be found in liberal constitutionalism but in social democracy - namely that the policies aimed at achieving greater social inclusion and economic equality can protect both constitutional liberalism and democracy. Therefore, one can also conclude that the recent rise of illiberalism and populism is almost inevitable for two reasons. On the one hand, these ups and downs of liberal democracy have always been present in history. On the other hand, the weakening of social inclusion and the extreme growth of economic inequalities among Europeans cannot lead to anywhere else other than to questioning the institutions of both constitutional liberalism and democracy. This relationship is even clearer if one compares the yearly maps of the Gini Index - an indicator that shows the income inequalities within a given society - with the map of the rise of illiberal, populist forces around the world. Based on the above-mentioned logic, it is not a coincidence that the highest inequalities are present in those countries where illiberalism and/or populism are also rising. Thus, paraphrasing Zakaria’s sentence cited above: if a liberal democracy does not preserve economic stability, welfare, and social inclusion, that it is a liberal democracy is a small consolation. Streeck puts all this in the context of neoliberalism and globalisation, claiming that the rise of populism is rooted in the failure of neoliberal governance and the exposure of people to global markets, where they could hardly find any help and security when economic crises hit society. The criticism of liberal democracy from the people’s perspective is called populism by the elites, including not only political but social, intellectual elites, as well. In his view, ‘[p]opulisn’ is diagnosed in normal internationalist usage as a cognitive problem. Its supporters are supposed to be people who demand ‘simple solutions’ because they do not understand the necessarily complex solutions that are so indefatigably and successfully delivered by the tried and tested forces of internationalism; their
