OCR
44 Tamas Kocsis 1989: 26). According to this theory, the value of the goods and services does not simply evolve on the basis of individual preferences. Rather, these preferences must be used as the basis for defining their value (normativity). As exploring the preferences of future generations is impossible, one must resort to the subjective judgment of the present generation as it appears on the market whenever one considers the use of resources and the natural environment. Neoclassical economists think that there is no inherent law in the environmental or social systems that ought to influence the evaluation and use of resources. Market failures, of course, provide arguments for community (state) intervention, but such intervention is rather alien to this theoretical framework (Christensen 1989: 27; cf. Pearce — Turner 1990: 11). The cradle of neoclassical economics was the so-called marginal revolution. Menger (1871) properly identified the role of raw materials and intermediate (half-ready) products in the production of goods. He also clearly recognized fixed rates among inputs. However, in his theory on the role of prices, he had to postulate the discretional substitutability of inputs so as to evaluate the effect of the presence or absence of a specific factor (Christensen 1989: 24). In his theory of capital, Jevons (1871) eliminated the difference between fixed and circulating capital. He thought that fixed capital was a more durable version of circular capital, and by circular capital, he understood solely the food and lodging necessary for the subsistence of laborers. In this way, his theory of capital completely ignored the significance of machines, raw materials and industrial fuel (Christensen 1989: 23). The final version of the mistaken idea that each input independently contributed to the output was Walras’ General Equilibrium Theory (1874). Just as the croplands provide a harvest year by year, so too do machines, tools and equipment — under the mistaken agricultural analogy. But the theory is silent about how this process continues without the material and energy needed for the activity (Christensen 1989: 24; cf. 1991: 78). Just as classical economics was formed into a coherent system by Adam Smith, Alfred Marshall (1920), through the mediation of Wicksell, composed a whole from the findings of the marginal revolution. Marshall’s indecision and his cautiousness about the concept of marginal utility suggest that he was aware of the material implications of production and that he realized the incompatibility of this fact with marginalist equilibrium theory. He reiterated the flow of materials in economic growth, but this view is not reflected in his theory of production (Christensen 1989: 25). Marshall accepted the law of diminishing returns in agriculture, but in his view, rising prices stimulated new organizational solutions and improvements in knowledge. Hence, in the final analysis, the fact did not put a constraint on economic growth. He differentiated between renewable and exhaustible resources and only held the law of diminishing returns to be true of the former. Concerning non-renewable resources (e.g., mines), the decrease of stocks calls for more and more cost-intensive extraction solutions. Gradual depletion, similarly to the more intensive use of renewable resources, is to be reflected by rising prices. Marshall acknowledges the alternative services of nature as recognized by Mill (e.g., the beauty of the landscape, etc.). In his view, they have no direct monetary value, yet on the market their price is usually lower than their actual value (Babier 1989: 16-18).