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OCR
This is the starting point for Schellingian jurisprudence, which, like Kant’s, is based on the will, the wanting. Freedom in this case is freedom of will. There are three elements to this 3.1. Original rights, the lack of cooperation; 3.2 Compulsory rights, the possibility of cooperation; 3.3 Constitutional rights, the coercion of cooperation. 3.1. Original rights cannot yet be called rights, nor can Schelling take them seriously. At the same time, they form the basis of rights. The original will (because everything must have a starting point, in this case: the Urwille) is inherently unlimited in nature, its freedom is an unlimited freedom. This can only seemingly remain the case, since if it were to be unrestricted, as mentioned earlier, that would mean the complete abolition of freedom. There is no communication here. Translated to our Cro Magnons, they assume that they are the most precisely circumscribed centers of the world (the way children do), nothing bad can happen to them, they can do anything. Then they encounter the other, which/who is the limit of our Cro Magnons’ world. Their freedom already contained this subverting element. The Cro Magnons do not read Plato or Kant, which in their time would be a bit problematic, so they do not know that according to philosophy (the Greek, modern or even German idealism’s conception of freedom) this question is vital, and therefore, with a few exceptions, they consider unlimited freedom, even as a concept, to be meaningless. Freedom does not, cannot exist without restriction. It is necessary to limit freedom, so the concept of freedom can be described not by kénnen (what I am capable of) but rather by diirfen (what I may do). “Was ich darf, ist mein Recht.” (What I am allowed to do is my right.) I only have the right to do what I am allowed to do. Law is thus the science of diirfen, which asks: What may I do? (Ibid. 95-104.§.) Mostly without infringing on the rights of the other, the Romans
