Oldal 24 [24]
OCR
ingeniously captures the essence of the thing. In his later works, he refers to the self as a relation (Forhold). (SKS 11. p. 129.) And that is what it is. Hegel formulates this in the following (slightly more complex, but crystal clear) manner: In itself that life is indeed an unalloyed sameness and unity with itself, since in such a life there is neither anything serious in this otherness and alienation, nor in overcoming this alienation. However, this in-itself is abstract universality, in which its nature, which is to be for itself, and the self-movement of the form are both left out of view. (PoS. p.13., PdG. p.24.) Identity is thus contentlessness, that which cannot be made sense of by itself. The three principles that then follow through all of Hegelian philosophy are as follows: - Same (an sich) - Other (ftir sich) - Same (an- und für sich)? Looking at the Hegelian example, these correspond to 1. The seed (the self, proceeding from the self), 2. The seedling (the immediately opposing other, even while the two assume each others existence), 3. The mature plant (abolished opposition = new identity). That is, the seedling denies the seed (the seed “dies” in the seedling), and the plant eliminates both the seed and the seedling while preserving the essence of both (there is no plant without seed and seedling). This is the topos of preserving-while-ending (Aufhebung, sublation, see to the terminology of German idealism Schelling 2000 pp.109), which, while important insight, is a purely theoretical construct. In the states between their transitions, the Hegelian concept of “mediation” emerges, which Kierkegaard will later call the magic magical tool of Hegelian philosophy. This is 9 Initself, for itself, in and for itself.
