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022_000076/0000

On the Concept of Alien

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Auteur
Zoltán Gyenge
Field of science
Filozófia, filozófiatörténet / Philosophy, history of philosophy (13033)
Type of publication
monográfia
022_000076/0020
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Page 21 [21]
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022_000076/0020

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Einheitslehre). In Kantian philosophy, because of the lack of a first principle, there is no ultimate foundation, which is to say, a unity of principle. However, the unity of the self with the same is the starting point of all further processes, though as we shall see it is not sufficient for self-determination. It might not be sufficient, but identity as a fundamental theorem is necessary. And it looks like this: this is precisely the moment when Narcissus stands there lonely and alone, without any reflection, as Ovid writes, "being consulted as to whether the child would live a long life, to a ripe old age, the seer with prophetic vision replied: ‘If he does not discover himself’. (Ovid 2000. III.pp.339-366) This is the state of contentless identity. Narcissus’s loneliness is a perfect lack of thought. He feels but does not think, the wonderful childhood of perception with no potential for apperception. The unity of this principle reveals two things: the starting point and the end point can be none other than sameness. How we get there is the question. And how these two identities differ is also a separate question. Schelling, despite the shift in emphasis in his later philosophy, thinks the same: The fundamentals of individual sciences cannot be derived in these sciences, but must be unconditional in relation to them. That’s why the ‘Grundsazt’ can only be one. (SW.I.1. pp.85-112.) According to him, in Kant the idea of unity, the unity of the first principle (Einheit des Grundsatzes), is missing, and if it is missing, it becomes impossible to lay the foundations for any further steps. Everyone agrees with this at the time—with the exception, perhaps, of Kant himself. All this may seem completely uninteresting compared to what was said in the introduction, but when we think about it, thinking in general cannot be coherent without a basis for coherence itself, that is, a certain first principle. Clarification of the concept of “the same” certainly requires this, even if it seems either unnecessary or overcomplicated. That is why I try to clarify these with examples that can be easily understood.Finding and applying the first principle (as the basis of our thinking) and the

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