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GERD VAN RIEL the One-Many and the Many-One, in order to explain how multiplicity can derive from the existence of the One (Damascius, DP II, 39, 8-25). Ihat is hardly the language of a sceptic. Ultimately, he positions the Ineffable as the first principle above and beyond the One, and then of course he has to guestion its nature as a principle, as something entirely separate from the system cannot be seen as a principle in the literal sense (which is the opening guestion of the De Principiis: Damascius, DP I, 1, 4-2, 20). It is true that Damascius also emphasizes the fact that all discursive language about the intelligible world (which by definition transcends the discursive intellect) can only be an “indication” (Evöeıdıc), and that we should not “count the intelligible on our fingers” (Damascius, DP III 136, 8-9). In that sense, too, one could maintain that he reverses \oyoc on the level of the intelligible. But that does not do away with the fact that the discursive analyses are taken seriously as indications. In other words, they are still the best way to explain to our own mind how the intelligible world operates. 4. MYSTICISM AND “OPEN METAPHYSICS” Where does this access to mysticism leave us, finally, in our philosophical quest for understanding the world? I believe it works only in an open metaphysical system. The term “open metaphysics” usually refers to an anti-dogmatic metaphysics that does not accept one single truth claim and which thus allows for diverse and manifold answers to metaphysical questions. In doing so, it is thoroughly immanentistic and tends to dismiss transcendence, as the recognition of transcendence always seems to lead to the acceptance of an absolute, transcendent realm. Or, as Jan Patocka formulates it: Transcendence is, fatally and irreversibly, converted into a transcendent, supraworldly reality, a transcendent divinity.” I allow myself here to give the term “open metaphysics” a different meaning, based on the way in which a metaphysical system relates to its own dogmatic principles, while at the same time accepting the fundamental role of transcendence. | take it that the claims of an open metaphysics can be exclusive and dogmatic; the openness depends on the cognitive status of the metaphysical principles in place. A “closed metaphysics” would be a metaphysical system that allows one to have a final access to the truth, such as Aristotelian metaphysics. It should in principle be possible to grasp 4° Jan Patoëka, Sebrané spisy, 1: Pece o dusi, | [Collected Works, vol. 1: Care of the Soul, Part I], Praha, Oikumene, 1996, 311, quoted by Johann P. Arnason, The Idea of Negative Platonism: Jan Patocka’s Critique and Recovery of Metaphysics, Thesis Eleven, 90 (2007), 6-26 [here: p. 12]. + 182 + Daréczi-Sepsi-Vassänyi_Initiation_155x240.indb 182 6 2020.06.15. 11:04:19
