Oldal 178 [178]
OCR
GERD VAN RIEL This means, I take it, that the scientific theology of philosophy does have a distinct epistemic priority: its doctrines are confirmed by the sacred texts, not founded by them (contrary to what is at stake, e.g., in the JudeoChristian or Islamic tradition, where reason is used to explain holy Scripture). Consequently, then, if one climbs up towards unification with the highest principle, this should be argued for, not just by having recourse to theurgy, but by philosophical reflection, which is then confirmed by hieratic practice. 2. VIA NEGATIVA AND REVERSAL OF DISCOURSE This brings us to the second way in which Neoplatonism can be called a mystical doctrine: not by having recourse to secret theological doctrines, but by philosophical discourse itself. From Plotinus onwards, the Neoplatonists have stressed the apophatic nature of their determinations of the first principle. How do we reach the One?—asks Plotinus at the end of his treatise titled On the Knowing Hypostases and That Which is Beyond. The answer is short but says it all: “Take away everything” (Agede nävra, Plot., Enn. V 3 [49], 17, 38). And when, in the hands of Syrianus and Proclus, the Parmenides comes to be read as a treatise on philosophical theology, the whole analysis of the first principle is built on the negations Plato’s Parmenides puts forward in what is called the first hypothesis. In this way, Neoplatonic theology is negative theology: It is better, as Plato did, to stick to the negations, and to indicate through them the transcendent superiority of the One, namely that it is not intelligible nor intellective, nor any other of those things that we cognize by our pluralized conceptualization (ô1 ëmBolñs pepiots). For as the One is the cause of all things, it is nothing of all things. (Proclus, In Parm. V1 1108, 19-29) The first One can only be discussed in a negative way: it is not many, not divided, not in time, etc.; it cannot even have being, as Plato concludes. And even the name “One” would be too much to affirm—as a name, this label remains attached to our conceptualization, and has no referent in the reality “up there”. Hence, Proclus asserts that it is not possible to grasp the ineffable by reason: It does not come as a surprise, then, that those who want to know the ineffable by reason, render reason itself impossible: any knowledge that tries to grasp an object to which it is not connected, destroys its own power. If for example we were to say that sense perception connects to the object of knowledge, it would render itself * 176 ¢ Daréczi-Sepsi-Vassänyi_Initiation_155x240.indb 176 6 2020.06.15. 11:04:19
