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MYSTICISM AND RATIONALITY. A NEOPLATONIC PERSPECTIVE an intentional object that is directed toward some state of affairs in the world, nor does it admit of the subject-object dichtomy [sic] that lies at the heart of, for example, Western grammar. More than this, intellectual truth is not available for transmission in any discursive form.’ Although she does not refer to Wittgenstein, it is clear that Rappe is touched by his influence more than superficially. This becomes even clearer when, a few pages further on, she writes the following: One could go further in this discussion of the fictionality of tradition and suggest that the highest form of Neoplatonic hermeneutics might posit philosophy as, in the last result, mere fiction. After all, is this not fundamentally the position of Damascius, for whom the foundational premises of first philosophy, including causal explanation and the existence of a first principle, are shown to be the creations of ignorance?” Especially in the case of Damascius, the last headmaster of the Athenian Academy upon the closure of all pagan schools by the emperor Justinian in 529 AD, Rappe refers to this ignorance as a specific sort of scepticism; Damascius’ reference to a “reversal of discourse” (nepitpomi) tTwv Oywv, Damascius, De Principiis [DP] I 21, 18) would amount, in her words, to “arguments overturned by means of premises internal to them” and a way of indicating the “limit of philosophical discourse” (mépac tot Adyov, Damascius, DP1 22, 2).3 In this contribution, I wish to inquire into the basic presuppositions of this interpretation of Damascius’ Neoplatonism. First, I seek to determine the degree to which the Neoplatonists can be seen as mystics, in order to come to a better understanding of this “reversal of discourse” and to examine the possibility of connecting this with scepticism. Finally, from what we will have gained, I will return to the relationship between philosophy and mysticism. Thus, the case of Neoplatonism may hopefully serve to further a better understanding of what is at stake in any mystical tradition. The question is, really, about the status of language. Are the Neoplatonists indeed indicating the limits of philosophy, in a Wittgensteinian vein? And is the point of Damascius’ terminology indeed that there is a mystical reality beyond language, which no expression whatsoever is capable of communicating, as truth is not structured like language and is not the product of any discourse? And does the mystical indeed turn philosophy into mere fiction? Sara Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism. Non-discursive Thinking in the Texts of Plotinus, Proclus, and Damascius, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, 234-235. Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism, 242. ® Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism, 212-213; also 219 and 222. + 173 ¢ Daréczi-Sepsi-Vassänyi_Initiation_155x240.indb 173 6 2020.06.15. 11:04:19
