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THE REFORM OF THE LAW OF HOMICIDE IN ISRAEL somewhat lower level of culpability, that does not reach the very severe culpability required for aggravated murder. A critique of the Supreme Court complaining of unjust sentences, especially in cases of killing due to subjective provocation,” premeditated mercy killing, due to a rigid mandatory life imprisonment for murder — is being listened to, responded and remedied. The relatively broad category of diminished responsibility (taken out of murder) is a further example of this principle of culpability. In the former law, these instances (not including provocation) were included within murder with discretional mitigation of punishment. This was clearly unjust because of the undeserved stigma on the one hand and the effect of diluting murder and blurring its severity.'° An additional effort, in the new law, was invested in protecting not only minors and the vulnerable by defining their killing as aggravated murder, but also women who are victims of abuse by their partners and killed by the tyrant partner. This type ofkilling reflects a patronizing and condescending attitude towards women s dignity and equality. Two aggravated cases deal with special protection of women: One deals with the victim of homicide being a partner ofthe perpetrator and the killing was done following a systematic or prolonged abuse, physical or mental, by the tyrant partner;”’ This aggravation is intended to catch cases of abuse becoming into a way of life, desecrating the body of the abused victim and the sanctity of her life, leading gradually to a final scenario of fatal violence. The other deals with what is often named as killing due to “honor of the family”, namely killing as a punitive action intended to impose authority or instill fear and to impose ways of conduct on a community. Although the main aim of this case is this type of “honor killing”, the formulation is not restricted to this kind of case and is not conditioned on a cultural background. What makes this case so severe are the extreme affront to the rule of law, the violation of the human dignity of the victim who is being used (by killing her) to send a message, the horror instilled in women as a group, and the violation of women’s equality and liberty." A totally different kind of case, in a sense a mirror image of the killing by the abuser, is the leniency offered to the killing of the abusive tyrant. The new law 15 See F.H.Crim. 1042/04 Beton v. State of Israel, 61(3) 646 (2006). It is worth to mention that when the court was convinced that the perpetrator was subjectively provoked, and this provocation did not fulfill the requirement of the objective provocation of the reasonable man, the homicide still remain as murder with premeditation. See Ghanayim, The Reform of Homicide Offences. See bellow on the aggravated circumstance No. 6 in aggravated murder. 18 See the aggravated circumstance No. 5 in aggravated murder; and Mordechai Kremnitzer — Khalid Ghanayim, Honor Killing - An Aggravated Murder?, in Essays in Honor of Justice Joubran, Jerusalem, The Harry Sacher Institute for Legislative Research and Comparative Law, The Faculty of Law Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2022, (forthcoming, in Hebrew). + 149 «
