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HRVOJE VOLNER dinars to 0.60 dinars per kilogram in 1930, and that 60% of national income of Yugoslavia came from agricultural production, then it becomes clear that inequality had to be the cause of the destruction of the nation. In addition to everything else, we should mention a ten-year tax inequality between the newly acquired regions and the former Kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro, which was justified by the war damage, but also as a reward to Serbia for winning the war, and the newly added areas were treated as colonies.” The expropriation of forest estates especially affected the disposal of private property that became unsafe. Industrial companies for the exploitation of forest and wood processing (largely owned by foreign capital) tried to ensure the stability of their business, but this was only possible by providing concessions, which were charged by bribing the responsible people in the government. Although the interwar Yugoslavia publically wrote that it was the foreign capitalists (mainly Hungarian Jews) who had corrupted the country, it was the rulers who were setting up the framework of market competition. This certainly contributed to a slowdown in the modernization of the economic system of the country, where the industry was concentrated on drawing a maximum profit from raw materials and poorly qualified labor. The corruption, which in the interwar Yugoslavia was encouraged by the government, caused a significant delay in the modernization processes.”* The next cut was created by World War II, which caused the deletion of entire ethnic communities that were holders of modernization in certain areas. According to what has so far been researched, it is clear that the quisling government, supported by German invaders, expropriated the Serbs, Jews, Romas. Was this modernization by murder? Kept in Croatian archives are the documents that bring the decisions on nationalization of non-Aryan property. There were cases, such as the one of Viktor Gutmann, when the Ustasha officials kept some individuals in management positions if they could not replace them with someone more eligible. This is evidenced by letters of a circular character which sought the removal of Serbs, Jews and Masons from certain activities, but only if they were not necessary. In practice, all of this meant the loss of mostly professional manpower in trade, industry, transport, and the public sector, but also in the opposite direction, after the war, a loss 2 Mijo Mirkovié: Ekonomska struktura Jugoslavije, Zagreb, Nakladni zavod Hrvatske, 1950, 10, 13, 23-33; Ivan Laji¢ — Mario Bara: Ratovi, kolonizacija i nacionalna struktura Slavonije u dvadesetom stoljecu, Zagreb, Institut za migracije i narodnosti, 2009, 66-68, 70; Boris Krsev: Finansijska politika Jugoslavije 1918-1941; Novi Sad, Prometej, 2007, 64-74, 124, 125-128. Compare the papers of Zdenka Simonéi¢-Bobetko: Izvlastenje veleposjedni¢kih Suma u Hrvatskoj 1919-1941. godine, Casopis za suvremenu povijest 25, 1993, 232-233; and Osnovne karakteristike industrijskog razvoja na podruëju Hrvatske u meduratnom razdoblju, Acta Historico-Economica lugoslaviae, 1, Zagreb, 1974, 61-62; and also Smiljana Durovié: DrZavna intervencija u industriji Jugoslavije 1918-1941, Beograd, Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1986, 39, 42-50. , 144 "
