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ORSOLYA HORVÁTH
This is why Kierkegaard refers to Descartes at the beginning of his train
of thought." Descartes is a forerunner for Kierkegaard in so far as he sets
boundaries for human reason, which means he takes Gods authority above
the judgement of human reason. Why is this an essential discretion for
Kierkegaard’s chain of thought? Not because it represents a type of dogmatism,
which from the perspective of atheistic existentialism can be valued as
a negative attitude and which does not prove the existence of God, but
because it supposes it. If this is true, the philosophical value of the thoughts
under discussion could become doubtful. That God is incomprehensible for
human reason is not a precondition for Kierkegaard, but a consideration the
source of which lies in the reality of the experience of the factical human
life. Naturally, this could also be stated by dogmatic thinkers: the origo
of their philosophy is in fact not a dogma, but a consideration based on
everyday experience. However, Kierkegaard takes this concrete human life as
the basis of his thoughts. He does not presuppose that the reality of God is
incomprehensible to human reason, but instead works this notion out from
concrete human life as the only basis for his ideas. This is why the story of
Abraham has an extraordinary importance for him, since the experience of
Abraham illustrates in a particular way how the human being exists when
God enters the space of human experience.
Sartre says there is no convincing sign which could define with unambiguous
certainty the origin of the voice heard by Abraham. Kierkegaard also says:
“Whether the individual is in temptation /Anfechtung] or is a knight of
faith, only the individual can decide.” That means Abraham has to decide
whether the given experience is a challenge of a deception or a situation
in which the steadfastness of faith is being tried. If so, is what Kierkegaard
says not the same as Sartres interpretation of Kierkegaard? As far as I see,
Kierkegaard’s intention is quite different from Sartre’s interpretation. It is
quite different but at the same time this does not mean that it would be
easy to capture the difference.’ The starting point of Fear and Trembling
5 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 31-33.
® Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 148.
There are two main directions in interpreting Abraham’s story, which can contradict each
other: the first looks at the positive content of faith as paradox, the second concentrates
on the possible negative ethical consequences. In my view, it is the essential character of
the story that it opens the space of misunderstanding in a special way, as this is the nature
of paradox. In order to discover the real ethical perspectives of Abraham’s story, as the first
step, one must approach the paradox itself. See for example Sharon Krishek’s study, which
understands the narrative of Abraham as a universal positive answer for the human being’s
pain of loss (Sharon Krishek, The existential dimension of faith, in Daniel Conway (ed.),
Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, A Critical Guide, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 2015, 106-121.); or John Lippitt’s thoughts about hope in Abraham’s faith (John
Lippitt, Learning to Hope: The Role of Hope in Fear and Trembling, in Daniel Conway (ed.),
Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, A Critical Guide, Cambridge, Cambridge University
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