HERMENEUTICAL BORDERLINE SITUATIONS—
KIERKEGAARD AND THE COMPELLING SIGN
In his 1945 lecture VExistentialisme est un humanisme, Sartre looks at
Kierkegaard again and again while trying to outline an ethics based on
atheistic existentialism. Reflecting on Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, he
sees the situation of the decision in the story of Abraham as a hermeneutical
one. Accordingly, the decision whether to sacrifice his son lies in Abraham’s
hands; however, an original decision precedes this one: should the voice heard
by Abraham be understood as the voice of God? In Sartre’s view, there is no
“convincing sign” which would prove the divine origin of the voice. Therefore,
Abraham has to make a decision about the origin of the voice. This original
decision then determines the act. However, Kierkegaard’s meditations — as
I see them — tend to go in the direction that there can be such a compelling
sign — an expression which, as far as I know, is not used by Kierkegaard —
in connection with which there is no doubt about the divine origin, which is
impossible to interpret and makes man reach the decision. In my study, I try
to analyse the compelling sign in a phenomenological way on the basis of
Kierkegaard’s interpretation of the story of Abraham.
In his 1945 lecture Existentialism is a Humanism,’ Sartre articulated before
a large audience what he sees as the essence of existentialism. His aim, of
course, was not to sum up existentialism itself, but rather to give answers to
the criticism directed against it at the time. He wished to show the possibility
of an ethical concept based purely on existentialist grounds. More precisely,
he sought to present an ethics which is not afraid to take the radicalism of
1 Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism is a Humanism, trans. Carol Macomber, New Haven &
London, Yale University Press, 2007, 17-54.
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